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The United States holds contradictory views about large corpora-
tions. When Americans speak of breakthroughs in research and 
engineering, they are justly proud of large firms that pioneered 
railroads and steam engines in the 19th century, automobiles, 
electric power, and oil exploration in the 20th century, and 
computers, software, and biotechnology in the 21st century. Yet 
when talk turns to paying taxes, public opinion holds that large 
corporations should pay a higher statutory tax rate than other 
business firms, and enjoy fewer deductions in computing their 
taxable income. Despite common sense and the teachings of 
economics, tax discrimination is alive and well. 
A BAd IdeA
Why is tax discrimination a bad idea? Foremost because it penal-
izes the firm that can build a better turbine, a faster internet 
search engine, or drill for oil at an ocean depth of two miles. 
Discriminatory tax burdens on one group of firms drive scarce 
capital  and  entrepreneurial  energy  to  less  productive  firms, 
penalizing the entire economy. If the targets of discrimination 
are the nation’s largest firms (the norm in the United States) 
the country will find it harder to compete on a global scale in 
industries that require dedicated research for decades, industries 
that exhibit huge scale economies, and industries that network 
across national borders. 
US-based  multinational  corporations  (MNCs)—firms 
that account for the bulk of US exports, research and develop-
ment (R&D), and almost all outward direct investment—pay 
high taxes directly and indirectly on their equity earnings. The 
“commanding heights” of the US economy—MNCs with far-
flung business ties—pay the corporate rates depicted in table 
1, and their American shareholders pay additional tax. The US 
statutory corporate rate (federal and state combined) in 2010 
was  the  second  highest  among  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  countries,  at  39 
percent—11  percentage  points  higher  than  the  unweighted 
average of competing countries (table 1).1 In addition, American 
shareholders paid another 15 percent tax on qualifying divi-
dends received in their personal tax returns.
The plants of US MNCs are the most productive plants 
in the United States, both in terms of labor productivity and 
total factor productivity (output generated for a given quan-
tity of land, labor, and other inputs). These MNCs capture 
the  technological  and  social  benefits  from  economies  of 
scale.  Large  companies  are  the  most  technology-intensive, 
and spend the most on research and development. In 2008, 
the  largest  companies—defined  as  companies  that  employ 
5000 or more persons—accounted for 69 percent of all US 
1. Before he resigned, Prime Minister Kan in Japan was seeking a five 
percentage point reduction in Japan’s corporate tax rate; if his successor, Prime 
Minister Noda carries out this reform, the United States will be left with the 
most burdensome corporate tax regime amongst the OECD countries.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 6   O C T O b e r  2 0 1 1
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Table 1     Statutory, average, and marginal effective corporate tax rates for systemically important  





Average effective  
corporate tax ratesq
Marginal effective  
corporate tax rates, 2010b
OECD Tax 








Australiac 30.0 25.9 22.2 26.0 17.0
Brazild 34.0 21.4 n.a. 35.1 n.a.
Canada 29.5 9.8 25.5 20.5 23.4
China, P.R.e 25.0 6.0 n.a. 16.6 n.a.
Francef 34.4 8.2 27.5 34.0 23.8
Germanyg 30.2 22.9 24.2 23.8 20.7
Indiah 34.0 24.0 n.a. 33.6 n.a.
Italyi 27.5 22.8 24.3 26.9 22.6
Japan 39.5 27.9 33.0 29.5 30.5
Korea, Republic of 24.2 15.3 18.1 29.5 13.6
Mexico 30.0 23.1 28.4 17.5 27.7
Netherlandsj 25.5 20.9 19.4 16.8 15.1
Polandk 19.0 17.7 16.2 14.3 14.1
Russian Federationl 20.0 9.0 n.a. 31.9 n.a.
South Africam 34.6 24.3 n.a. 14.5 n.a.
Spain 30.0 20.9 27.5 25.4 26.3
Sweden 26.3 16.4 18.5 18.9 12.6
Switzerlandn 21.2 8.9 15.4 17.6 10.9
Turkey 20.0 17.0 13.1 5.6 7.3
United Kingdomo 28.0 23.2 22.3 27.9 18.8
United Statesp 39.2 27.6 29.0 34.6 23.6
Unweighted average, 
excluding United Statesr
28.1 18.3 21.0 23.3 20.8
n.a. = data not available
a. The statutory corporate tax rates for Organization for Economic Coopoeration and Development (OECD) countries (all countries except Brazil, China, India, 
Russia, and South Africa) show the combined central and subcentral corporate income tax rates. The subcentral coverage of statutory corporate tax rates for 
non-OECD countries is not necessarily consistent.
b. The marginal effective corporate tax rate measures the tax liability incurred on an additional dollar of investment and informs scaling choices, conditional on 
the location. The Chen and Mintz (2011) marginal effective rates do not include the effects of the 100 percent temporary capital expensing or “bonus deprecia-
tion” rules recently passed by Congress in December 2010 in the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010. This rule 
increased the current 50 percent bonus depreciation in the tax code’s section 168(k) to 100 percent for qualified property placed in service before December 
2011. Chen and Mintz calculated that this provision reduces the US effective tax rate to as low as 17.5 percent, but only for a single year; it does not provide 
certainty for firms in their capital planning decisions, and it may simply accelerate investment outlays. For these reasons, Chen and Mintz (2011) excluded bonus 
depreciation effects in their marginal effective tax rate calculation. Hassett and Mathur (2011) calculated their marginal effective tax rates based on the approach 
outlined by Devereux and Griffith (1999).
c. Australia has a non-calendar tax year. Its statutory rates are in effect as of July 1.
d. The Brazilian statutory corporate income tax rate is 25 percent. In addition, social contribution on net profits at a rate of 9 percent are levied, leading to an 
overall rate of 34 percent. The 25 percent corporate income tax rate includes a 15 percent basic rate on net profits with tax adjustments and an additional income 
tax of 10 percent on the net profit which excess BRL240,000 per year.
e. For statutory rates, from January 2008, foreign and domestic entities are subject to a single enterprise corporate income tax at a rate of  25 percent. However, 
the rate for a low–profit enterprise is 20 percent, and for a hi-tech enterprises the rate is 15 percent if certain conditions are met.
f. The French statutory rate includes a surcharge, but does not include the local business tax (Taxe professionnelle) or the turnover based solidarity tax (Contribution 
de Solidarite).
g. The German statutory rate includes the regional trade tax (Gewerbesteuer) and the surcharge.
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private sector R&D expenditures (table 2). R&D has created 
numerous new technologies in sectors ranging from energy, 
to computers and software, to bio-tech and health care. In 
addition to the social payoff from these technologies, R&D 
has consistently been associated with faster economic growth. 
Large companies pass on the benefits of scale economies to 
consumers in the form of lower prices. Despite the frequent 
vilification of Walmart, econometricians have shown that the 
arrival of a Walmart Supercenter leads to a 25 percent decrease 
in the average grocery bill for local consumers (Hausmen and 
Leibtag 2005). Efficient production also makes US goods and 
services more competitive internationally. Accordingly, large 
companies typically account for over 70 percent of US exports 
(table 3). 
In addition to the overall benefits that they deliver to the 
American economy, large companies create good jobs at high 
wages for American workers. In 2009, the largest companies 
provided jobs to 32 percent of the American workforce (table 
4.1).  Likewise  in  2009,  large  companies—here  defined  as 
companies with 500 or more workers—paid 50 percent higher 
hourly wages, provided 10 percent more working hours per 
week, and overall spent 36 percent more on annual payroll 
per employee than small companies—defined as companies 
that employ fewer than 100 persons (table 4.2). In addition 
to direct compensation, large companies consistently provide 
better fringe benefits. A report by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City concluded that “workers at large firms are much 
more likely to receive retirement benefits; life insurance; and 
health, dental, and vision insurance,” and that “eligibility for 
both short-term and long-term disability benefits are about 
twice as likely at large firms than at small firms.” Job stability is 
often considered the most important feature of the workplace. 
The report cites numerous studies which consistently find a 
positive correlation between firm size and job stability, as well 
as job satisfaction. Moreover, retirement plans are available to 
78 percent of large-firm workers, compared to only 44 percent 
of small-firm workers (Edmiston 2007). 
Conventional  wisdom  holds  that  small  companies 
account for the lion’s share of job growth, but this fails to 
distinguish between gross job creation and net job creation, 
nor does it take into account firm age. Recent research finds 
that, once company age is taken into account, company size 
no longer has a statistically significant effect on job growth. 
Most of the hype about small companies and net job growth 
reflects the job experience of start-up firms. The reality for the 
average worker is that large companies account for the biggest 
share of gross job growth. Thus, “if a worker is looking for 
the places where the most jobs are being created they should 
go where the jobs are—large and mature firms” (Haltiwanger, 
Jarmin, and Miranda 2010). 
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h. For statutory rates, domestic companies are generally taxed at the rate of 30 percent; however profits from life insurance business in India are taxed at a rate 
of 12.5 percent. Foreign companies are taxed at a rate of 40 percent. A Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) is levied at 15 percent of the adjusted profits of companies 
where the tax payable is less than 15 percent of their book profits. Dividend distribution tax (DDT) is levied at 15 percent on dividends distributed by a domestic 
company. Surcharge and education cess is applicable on the above taxes. A 10 percent surcharge in case of domestic companies and a 2.5 percent surcharge 
in case of foreign companies is applicable if total income is in excess of INR10 million. Education cess of 3 percent is applicable on income tax plus surcharge, if 
any. Wealth tax is imposed at a rate of 1 percent on the value of specified assets held by the taxpayer in excess of the basic exemption of INR3 million. Securities 
transaction tax (STT) is levied on the value of taxable securities transactions in equity shares and units of equity oriented funds.
i. The Italian statutory rates do not include the regional business tax (Imposta Regionale sulle Attività Produttive; IRAP). 
j. The Dutch statutory corporate tax rate applies to taxable income over EUR200,000.
k. There is no Polish subcentral government statutory tax. However, local authorities (at each level) participate in tax revenue at a specified percentage for each 
level of local authority.
l. The statutory corporate income tax is split into the federal tax (2 percent) and the regional tax (18 percent that can be reduced to 13.5 percent for some 
categories of taxpayers). Dividends distributed can be subject to a 9 percent or 0 percent withholding tax. Interest income on state securities can be subject to 
a 15 percent or 0 percent withholding tax percent.
m. The statutory corporate income tax rate is 28 percent. However, South Africa imposes an additional secondary tax on companies (STC) at 10 percent on any 
net dividends declared by them. Therefore, if a company distributes 100 percent of its after-tax earnings as a dividend, an effective tax rate of 34.55 percent will 
apply. This does not apply to gold mining companies (which are taxed on a formula basis) or to South African branches of foreign entities which are taxed at a 
rate of 33 percent. The STC may be replaced by a withholding tax in the future.
n. In Switzerland, church taxes cannot be avoided by enterprises. They are included in the statutory rates.
o. The United Kingdom has a non-calendar tax year. Its statutory rates are in effect as of April 1.
p. The US subcentral statutory corporate rate is a weighted average of state corporate marginal income tax rates. The US effective corporate rate excludes bonus 
depreciation. 
q. The average effective corporate income rate measures the average rate a firm might expect to face on an investment project over the possible range of 
profitability outcomes. Hassett and Mathur (2011) calculated their average effective tax rates based on the approach outlined by Devereux and Griffith (1999).
r. Hassett and Mathur (2011) do not have the data for some countries in the table. Hence, the unweighted average calculated from their numbers supplements 
the missing cells with data from either Chen and Mintz (2011) or the World Bank (2011) to enable a guesstimate.
Sources: Corporate tax rates for OECD countries are from OECD Tax Database (2011); Corporate tax rates for non-OECD countries are from KPMG’s Corporate 
and Indirect Tax Rate Survey (2010); Marginal effective corporate tax rates are from Chen and Mintz (2011); Average effective corporate income taxes are from 
Paying Taxes 2011: The Global Picture, World Bank and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011); Marginal and Average effective corporate income taxes are from Hassett 
and Mathur (2011); and authors’ calculations.
Table 1     Statutory, average, and marginal effective corporate tax rates for systemically important  
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Whatever  the  relative  contribution  of  large  and  small 
companies to gross or net job growth, the bottom line for 
American workers—and the American economy as a whole—
is to ensure that the United States remains a favorable location 
for US-based MNCs to do business. 
Other countries, with a stronger egalitarian streak than the 
United States, ranging from Sweden to France to Canada, love 
their largest corporations, bestowing upon them the accolades 
of “national champions.” Support for these companies takes 
many forms. In the more extreme cases, companies are awarded 
monopoly rights as well as government financing (e.g., China’s 
support for its state-owned enterprises). In less extreme cases, 
companies receive support via subsidized loans and significant 
tax breaks (e.g., Korea’s chaebols). A more modest type of affec-
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Table 3     Export value by firm size, 2008
Number of employees 1–19 20–99 100–499 500 or more Total
Total export value (in billions) $93.1 $81.7 $102.9 $788.0 $1,065.7
Number of Firms  112,220 49,739 17,944 7,079 186,982
Share of total export value 8.7% 7.7% 9.7% 73.9% 100.0%
Average export value (in millions) $0.8 $1.6 $5.7 $111.3 $5.6
Notes: Figures only include direct exporters. Does not include non-exporting firms or firms which support export production.
Sources: International Trade Administration, Exporters Database.
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Table 4.1     Employment and payroll by firm size, 2008
Number of 
employees Number of firms Total employment
Total annual payroll 
(billions of dollars)
Average payroll  
per employee
Share of total 
annual payroll 
(percent)
0–99 11,116,000 63,608,000 2,300.0 $36,000 38.6
100–499 90,000 17,547,000 700.0 $40,000 12.0
500–999 9,000 6,299,000 300.0 $43,000 4.6
1,000–2,499 5,000 8,358,000 400.0 $46,000 6.5
2,500–4,999 2,000 6,726,000 300.0 $49,000 5.6
5,000–9,999 1,000 6,773,000 300.0 $50,000 5.7
10,000+ 1,000 33,025,000 200.0 $48,000 26.9
Total 11,224,000 142,338,000 4,500.0 $41,000 100.0
Sources: US Census Bureau, Statistics of US Businesses.
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Table 2     Research & development expenditure by firm size, 2008




R&D as a  
percentage of sales Share of total R&D 
US Worldwide US Worldwide US Worldwide US Worldwide
5–99 522.3 603.1 28.5 36.2 5.5 6.0 7.0 5.5
100–249 284.3 350.3 12.9 16.4 4.6 4.7 3.8 3.2
250–499 211.1 257.0 8.8 11.2 4.2 4.4 2.8 2.3
500–999 261.4 392.4 10.1 13.4 3.9 3.4 3.5 3.6
1,000–4,999 1,032.2 1,471.0 39.3 56.1 3.8 3.8 13.8 13.4
5,000–24,999 2,271.9 3,234.7 59.3 86.4 2.6 2.7 30.4 29.6
25,000 or more 2,892.2 4,634.0 74.6 109.6 2.6 2.4 38.7 42.3
Total 7,475.4 10,942.5 233.5 329.3 3.1 3.0 100.0 100.0
R&D = Research and development
Sources: National Science Foundation/Division of Science Resources Statistics, Business R&D and Innovation Survey: 2008.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 6   O C T O b e r  2 0 1 1
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tion—simply  abandoning  discriminatory  tax  practices  and 
proposals that significantly disadvantage US companies glob-
ally—would make a great deal of sense for the United States. 
Yet An Old IdeA 
Ignoring the economic record and tax practice elsewhere, the 
US Congress has a long history of penalizing corporate size 
through  higher  tax  rates.  As  early  as  1909,  Congress  taxed 
corporate income in excess of $5,000 at a rate of 1 percent, but 
exempted the first $5,000. When the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1936 was enacted, discrimination became serious: That law 
taxed the first $2,000 of corporate income at 8 percent, esca-
lating to 15 percent for income in excess of $40,000. Today, 
the federal rates escalate from 15 percent on the first $50,000 
of corporate income, to 35 percent for income in excess of $10 
million. Average effective tax rates—the rate which companies 
actually paid—discriminate even more against large corpora-
tions. In 2009, the largest corporations—those with over $2.5 
billion in assets—paid an average of 32.9 percent in income 
taxes as share of total taxable income, compared with an average 
1.1 percent for the smallest firms—those with $500,000 or less 
in assets. When global operations are taken into account, the 
largest corporations accounted for more than three-fourths of 
corporate tax revenue (table 5). 
Escalating  rates  are  only  one  worrisome  feature  of  tax 
discrimination  against  large  corporations.  After  the  16th 
Amendment  was  ratified  in  1913,  Congress  exempted  sole 
proprietorships  and  partnerships  from  the  corporate  tax. 
Income earned by these enterprises was simply merged with 
the income earned by the proprietor or partner and taxed on 
his  individual  return.  In  technical  terms,  these  enterprises 
are treated as “pass-through” entities: Their income is passed 
through to the individual return and taxed only at that level. 
That was fine in an era when proprietorships and partnerships 
were truly small ventures: the famed family farm, the five-man 
legal or medical practice, and the local hardware store. Over 
the last forty years, however, the small partnership has been 
extended beyond recognition to cover an array of enterprises, 
some quite large, yet taxed as pass-through entities. This new 
generation  of  enterprises  travels  under  comparatively  recent 
legal forms: the Subchapter S corporation (Sub S), the limited 
liability  company  (LLC),  the  limited  liability  partnership 
(LLP), the master limited partnership (MLP), the real estate 
investment trust (REIT), the real estate mortgage investment 
conduit (REMIC), and cooperatives (co-ops). We do not high-
light this feature to suggest “rolling back the clock” and taxing 
pass-through firms as corporations. What we do emphasize is 
that corporations are subject to two layers of income taxation 
(business and personal) while competing pass-though firms are 
only subject to one (personal). Hence a significant tax bias exists 
against all corporations to begin with, and when large corpo-
rations are treated more harshly than other corporations, the 
discrimination becomes more severe. 
In 2007, the US corporate tax base—in other words, taxable 
corporate profit—was just 13 percent of GDP, compared with 
the OECD unweighted average (excluding the United States) 
of 22 percent. However, in the early 2000s, some 82 percent 
of US business firms were not incorporated enterprises; instead 
they were pass-through entities (table 6). By comparison, in a 
sampling of other advanced counties, only around a third of 
business firms are not incorporated. Moreover, the fraction of 
US business activity subject to corporate taxation has progres-
sively declined. In 1980, Subchapter S corporations (a promi-
nent type of pass-through firm) accounted for just 3 percent of 
business receipts; in 2007 they accounted for 20 percent (table 
7). By Peter Merrill’s (2007) reckoning, in 1987, business enti-
ties that were subject only to pass-through taxation accounted 
for 29 percent of total business income; however, by 2007, they 
claimed around 52 percent of total business income.2 Thus, 
when critics argue that corporate income taxes today account 
for a lower share of US tax revenue than in prior years, and a 
lower share of GDP than in some foreign countries, they are 
comparing apples and oranges—such comparisons ignore the 
growing role of pass-though firms which are not taxed as corpo-
rations; they also ignore the greater prominence of pass-through 
firms in the United States than aboard. Comparisons of this 
nature simply cannot be used to support the contention that 
corporate America is undertaxed.
2. See Merrill (2007), page 3 for data though 2004. Merrill provided updated 
data to the authors. 
The bottom line for American workers—and 
the American economy as a whole—is to 
ensure that the United States remains 
a favorable location for US-based 
multinational corporations to do business. 
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Table 4.2     Hourly wages by firm size,  
  private industry, 2009
Number of 
employees 1–49 50–99 100–499
500 or 
more
Mean hourly earnings $17.80 $19.10 $20.42 $26.65
Mean weekly hours 33.60 34.20 35.80 37.00
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 6   O C T O b e r  2 0 1 1
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ReAsOns fOR tAx dIscRImInAtIOn
At least four enduring but ill-informed reasons explain why 
encrusted lumps of tax discrimination find their way into the 
tax code and persist for decades, despite the harm they visit on 
the US economy. 
Tax That Fellow Behind the Tree 
One explanation tracks Senator Russell B. Long’s famous apho-
rism about the political forces which drive tax legislation: “Don’t 
tax you, don’t tax me, tax that fellow behind the tree.” In the eyes 
of many Congressmen, large corporations that do business on a 
global scale are well hidden behind the tree. Americans and their 
representatives in Congress have long entertained the notion that 
a corporate check paid to the US Treasury means “somebody 
else” pays the tax, conveniently forgetting that the money has to 
come from someplace—higher prices (from consumer pockets), 
lower wages (fewer jobs, reduced salaries), less investment (both 
R&D and physical equipment), or smaller dividends (hurting 
pensions and universities, not just John Q. Moneybags). This 
last source is not the largest target. On average, the ten S&P 500 
companies that paid the highest dividends in 2010 distributed 
N U M B E R   P B 1 1 - X X X  M O N T H   2 0 1 1
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Table 5     Corporate tax revenue by firm size, 2008 (billion dollars)
Percent































Under $500K 122.1 7.4 1.4 0.0 1.4 6.8 0.4 1.1 0.3
$500K–$1M 32.4 3.7 0.9 0.0 0.9 1.8 0.3 2.8 0.2
$1M–$5M 80.2 12.7 3.8 0.0 3.8 4.4 1.1 4.8 0.9
$5M–$10M 36.4 7.7 2.6 0.0 2.6 2.0 0.8 7.2 0.6
$10M–$25M 48.5 11.8 3.9 0.1 4.0 2.7 1.2 8.2 0.9
$25M–$50M 35.8 10.3 3.5 0.1 3.6 2.0 1.0 10.1 0.8
$50M–$100M 35.4 12.6 4.3 0.2 4.5 2.0 1.3 12.8 1.0
$100M–$250M 56.9 23.5 8.2 0.6 8.8 3.1 2.4 15.4 2.0
$250M–$500M 61.4 31.6 11.0 1.4 12.4 3.4 3.3 20.2 2.8
$500M–$2.5B 229.3 118.5 41.3 5.6 46.9 12.7 12.3 20.5 10.8
Over $2.5B 1,035.8 717.7 251.0 90.0 341.0 57.3 74.6 32.9 78.3
Total 1,806.8 971.1 336.7 98.8 435.5 100.0 100.0 24.1 100.0
a. Net income is the net profit or loss from taxable sources of income reduced by allowable deductions.
b. Differs from net income primarily by “Statutory Special Deductions.”
c. Foreign tax paid is based on the foreign tax credit claimed by firms in their US coporate tax returns.
d. Amount of worldwide income tax paid as a percentage of net income.
Source: IRS Corporate Tax Statistics.
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Table 6     Incorporated firms as a share  
  of total firms in selected OECD  
  countries (percent of total business
  firms)
Incorporated 










Unweighted average of sample 
countries, excluding the  
United States
33.4
OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development
Note: Year of data for each country ranges from 2003 to 2006. For 
details please refer to table 3 in the OECD study.
Source: Survey on the Taxation of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises, OECD (2007).N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 6   O C T O b e r  2 0 1 1
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less than 5 percent of total corporate revenues to shareholders.3 
Moreover, pension plans typically have significant holdings in 
large corporations. For example, the Missouri and Ohio state-
employee public pension plans held 4.8 percent and 4.4 percent 
of their assets in oil and natural gas firms, respectively. In both 
states, these holdings accounted for over a tenth of their annual 
returns between 2005 and 2009 (Shapiro and Pham 2011).
Tax the Rich 
Another explanation springs from the fallacy that imposing an 
extra tax burden on large corporations is a fine way of extracting 
money from the pocket of John Q. Moneybags, namely the 
richest  one  percent  of  Americans.  This  fallacy  ignores  three 
facts:  First,  as  mentioned,  dividends  paid  by  large  corpora-
tions typically account for less than 5 percent of their annual 
revenue stream; second, more than half of dividends paid by 
these  corporations  go  to  shareholders  with  adjusted  annual 
incomes of less than $250,000;4 and third, the ownership of 
small firms (whether partnerships or corporations) is typically 
far more concentrated than the ownership of large corporations 
(John Q. Moneybags looms largest in the ownership profile of 
small firms).
Populism 
A  third  explanation  draws  upon  the  populist  strand  in 
American history. Populism dates back to President Andrew 
Jackson if not earlier, but a more recent expression was the 
“Cross of Gold” speech delivered by William Jennings Bryan 
at the Democratic convention of 1896, where he denounced 
the moneyed interests of New York and London. That strand 
was spun into a whole length of yarn by Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt during the Great Depression. Among many memo-
rable statements, Roosevelt declared, "Organized money hates 
me—and I welcome their hatred!" Populist spirits spring to 
life in hard times, but their expression differs from one era 
to the next. Today, when the United States faces high unem-
3. Based on calculations by the authors from Annual 10K SEC filings. 
4. Internal Revenue Service, SOI Tax Stats—Individual Income Tax Return 
(Form 1040) Statistics, Table 4.1, www.irs.gov (accessed on August 17, 2011). 
ployment, these spirits are erupting in anti-globalization, anti-
outsourcing, and anti-MNC sentiments.5 
Ability to Pay
Possibly the most enduring rationale for imposing higher tax 
rates on large corporations is the argument that they have a 
greater “ability to pay.” As the law is now written, the largest 
corporations (those with assets of $2.5 billion or more) pay 
about  three-fourths  of  US  corporate  income  taxes,  even 
though  they  account  for  just  57  percent  of  corporate  net 
income (see table 5). The ability to pay rationale contains 
three misleading ingredients. First, it confuses corporations 
with individuals. Someone who earns $500,000 has a greater 
ability to pay than someone who earns $50,000, and it seems 
fair for the richer person to pay a larger share of his income in 
taxes. The same argument does not apply to firms. The size of 
the firm says nothing about the size of individual ownership 
shares, nor does it correlate with the annual income of the 
individual owners. Second, when ability to pay is translated 
into tax laws that penalize size, a sure result is that capital 
and brains will migrate to alternative ownership structures, 
exacting an efficiency cost on the economy. Third, even in an 
age of globalization, rather few rich individuals surrender their 
citizenship to escape higher individual income taxes; but in 
this age, many goods and services can be produced in friend-
lier tax jurisdictions when the IRS claims a bigger share of 
income from larger US firms.6 
5. In a speech promoting The American Jobs Act, President Obama recently 
declared, “Do we keep tax loopholes for oil companies—or do we put teachers 
back to work?” This rhetoric implies that the administration’s plan will raise 
$35 billion for “teachers and first responders” by taxing oil and gas companies. 
See The American Jobs Act, page 6, available at www.americanjobsact.com.
6. Arthur Laffer and Stephen Moore (2009) find substantial evidence that rich 
Americans move within the United States to states with lower income and 
estate taxes. See an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, available at http://online.
wsj.com/, which discusses their book, available at www.alec.org. However, 
only a tiny number of Americans shed their citizenship each year to escape 
the IRS.
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Table 7     US business activity by corporate form (percent of business receipts)
Form of business 1980 1990 2000 2007
Subchapter C Corporations 86.2 74.7 68.0 62.1
Subchapter S Corporations (pass-through) 3.2 14.3 17.2 20.3
Sources: SOI Tax Statistics, Integrated Business Data, International Revenue Services, 2010.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 6   O C T O b e r  2 0 1 1
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cOntempORARY thReAts Of tAx 
dIscRImInAtIOn
Tax discrimination in favor of “small business” (recognizing 
that some pass-through firms are giant enterprises) has been 
a gradually expanding feature of the Internal Revenue Code. 
More recent, and more troubling, are proposals that translate 
into tax discrimination against large corporations.
Higher Taxes on MNCs
Conspicuous are the Obama Administration’s repeated calls to 
tax the income earned abroad by US-based MNCs more heavily, 
despite the fact that corporate tax systems elsewhere follow the 
norm of territorial taxation—meaning rules that tax corporate 
profits earned at home but not corporate profits earned abroad. 
Japan and the United Kingdom were the latest countries to join 
the “territorial tax club” (table 8). The United States remains 
the major exception, to its disadvantage as a global competitor. 
Mexico, Ireland, Israel, and Korea are the only other OECD 
countries not in the territorial club (Hufbauer and Wong 2011).
Yet, if he has his way, President Obama would put even 
more distance between the US tax system and the territorial 
club, and impose sharply higher taxes on the largest US corpo-
rations. In his first budget blueprint,7 released in February 
2009 for fiscal year 2010, President Obama proposed to deliver 
on a campaign promise: “When I am President, I will end the 
tax giveaways to companies that ship our jobs overseas, and I 
will put the money in the pockets of working Americans, and 
seniors, and homeowners who deserve a break.”8 The FY2010 
budget laid down a marker that sharply divided the Obama 
administration  from  nearly  all  CEOs  of  US-based  MNCs. 
Obama’s  “reforms,”  estimated  to  raise  $210  billion  in  tax 
revenues over 10 years (from 2010 to 2019), include curbs 
on the foreign tax credit, repeal of other tax credits (e.g., the 
enhanced oil recovery credit), and higher taxes (e.g., an excise 
tax on Gulf of Mexico oil and gas).
Although  this  agenda  gained  no  traction  in  Congress, 
in his next budget blueprint, released in February 2010 for 
FY2011, Obama pursued similar themes, though on a smaller 
scale.  And  again,  in  his  budget  message,  for  FY2012,  the 
7. A New Era of Responsibility, Renewing America’s Promise, Budget of the 
United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010, www.gpoaccess.gov (accessed on 
December 8, 2010).
8. Remarks of Senator Barack Obama, “A Change We Can Believe In,” 
Spartanburg, SC, November 3, 2007, www.barackobama.com (accessed on 
February 15, 2011).
president called for around $129 billion (over 10 years) from 
higher taxes on profits earned abroad.9 
More  recently,  President  Obama’s  “Plan  for  Economic 
Growth  and  Deficit  Reduction”,  released  in  September 
2011, would repeal the Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) method of 
accounting for inventory cost, thereby raising $52 billion over 
10 years on the back of anticipated inflation. The Plan would 
also reinstate the Superfund tax, even though that tax bears 
little connection to the true sources of environmental damage, 
raising another $19 billion over 10 years. Both measures are 
squarely targeted at large corporations.10
Higher Taxes on “Big Oil” 
“Big oil” is often a favorite target of tax discrimination. In 
the most recent saga, Senators Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and 
Charles  Schumer  (D-NY),  along  with  several  co-sponsors, 
introduced  a  revised  version  of  their  Close  Big  Oil  Tax 
Loopholes  Act  in  May  2011  (first  introduced  in  February 
2011 as S. 258). The title and text of the bill make certain that 
higher taxes will be visited on just five firms (the “majors”): BP, 
Conoco-Phillips, Chevron, Royal Dutch Shell, and Exxon-
Mobil.11 How will higher taxes be achieved? In four ways: 12
n  By disadvantaging US “majors” compared to their foreign-
based competitors through higher US taxes when the majors 
extract petroleum abroad (the Middle East, Africa, etc.). 
Nearly all foreign-based competitors are either headquar-
tered in countries that practice territorial taxation, meaning 
they do not tax income earned abroad, or are state-owned 
9. For details, see Hufbauer and Wong (2011). Almost since its inception, 
the US Internal Revenue Code has taxed US corporations on their worldwide 
income but allows a credit for foreign corporate taxes and defers US taxation 
until profits are repatriated to the United States as dividends. If, as the Obama 
team has proposed, US taxes were collected in the year profits are earned 
abroad rather than the year when they are repatriated, the result would be 
a sharp increase in the effective tax rate paid by US-based MNCs on their 
worldwide income. Also, see Hufbauer and Assa (2007).
10. See President Obama’s recent budget proposals, Living Within Our Means 
and Investing in the Future: The President’s Plan for Economic Growth and Deficit 
Reduction (September 2011), available at www.whitehouse.gov. 
11. These are “major integrated oil companies,” as defined in IRC Section 
167(h)(5)(b), namely firms that produce worldwide over 500,000 barrels of 
oil a day and, in 2005, had gross receipts exceeding $1 billion. The provisions 
attacked in the Menendez bill are often called tax preferences or loopholes. 
However these provisions are available to other industries and generally on 
better terms, so that the oil and gas industry, and particularly the major oil 
and gas taxpayers, already receive less favorable tax treatment than the tax 
treatment generally available to others.
12. Many of these provisions were outlined in the Obama Administration’s 
2012 budget, but for all oil and gas firms, not just the majors. In an effort to 
secure more Congressional support, Senators Menendez and Schumer would 
limit their application to the majors. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 6   O C T O b e r  2 0 1 1
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Table 8     OECD home country method of taxing foreign-source dividends
Taxation method Countries
Dividend exemption 











































United States 0 39.2
OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
a. In general, territorial tax treatment dividends depends on qualifying criteria (e.g., minimum ownership level, minimum holding period 
in the source country, and/or the source country tax rate).
b. The effective exemption may be reduced by up to 5 percent as a proxy for general and administrative expenses.
c. The exemption percentage is at least 95 percent, but can be higher.
d. Refers to general applicable tax rate, including surcharges, of combined central and subcentral government taxes.
Sources: Country tax rates are from OECD, OECD Tax Database, “Roadmap for Growth”, Business Roundtable, 2010.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 6   O C T O b e r  2 0 1 1
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enterprises which are highly protected and supported. By 
contrast, the United States taxes foreign income, but allows a 
credit for foreign taxes paid. Under the Menendez-Schumer 
proposal, the method of calculation would reduce the credit 
and thereby increase the US tax bill. Over a period of years, 
the higher tax burden would diminish the role of US majors 
in the world energy picture, giving a distinct advantage to 
competitors such as PetroChina (China), Lukoil (Russia), 
Petronas (Malaysia), Total (France), and a flock of national 
oil companies based in the Middle East. Ironically, this 
provision would do little harm to BP and Shell, which are 
based outside the United States, and would actually provide 
them with a competitive advantage over the other three 
(Chevron,  ConocoPhillips,  and  ExxonMobil)  which  are 
headquartered in the United States. Whatever one thinks 
about  energy  independence  and  global  warming,  weak-
ening the US-based majors makes no sense. 
n  By raising the statutory tax rate by 2 percentage points 
on  the  domestic  manufacturing  income  earned  by  the 
majors. This would be accomplished by denying majors 
the benefit of a deduction available to all companies that 
earn income from "domestic production activities"13 The 
majors are heavily engaged in both oil and gas production 
and in "manufacturing,” principally the refining of crude 
petroleum. When the “manufacturing deduction” was first 
enacted in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, all qual-
ifying activities got the benefit of a deduction roughly equal 
to a 3 percentage point cut in the statutory tax rate (from 35 
percent to 32 percent), phased in over several years, but in 
2008, the oil and gas industry was limited to a 2 percentage 
point cut. 14 The Menendez-Schumer bill would compound 
this history of tax discrimination by denying the deduction 
altogether, but just for the “Big Five.”15 
n  By  repealing  the  provision  that  allows  majors  to  claim 
partial expensing of intangible drilling costs (IDC). The 
Code currently allows 100 percent expensing of IDC by 
“independent”  oil  firms,  but  only  70  percent  by  "inte-
13. Section 199 of the Internal Revenue Code, often called the "manu-
facturing deduction," is actually applicable to all production, extraction, 
manufacturing, and farming activities, and further includes software and film 
production, architectural and engineering services, and construction activities. 
See IRC Section 199 (c)(4).
14. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343).
15. Just to illustrate the nature of this last example of tax discrimination, three 
of the top five natural gas producers in the United States would continue to 
receive this deduction, while the other two would not. Two of the top five 
refiners would receive the benefit, while the other three would not. Foreign-
based companies operating in the Gulf other than Shell and BP, such as 
companies based in Brazil, Italy, Norway, Australia, and China, would receive 
the benefit on their US income, but US-based companies would not. 
grated" firms—in other words, firms engaged in produc-
tion plus refining and/or marketing (this limit was enacted 
in stages between1982 and 1986; it apples both to inte-
grated oil and gas firms and to other integrated mining 
firms). Intangible drilling costs for oil companies are the 
functional equivalent of research and development costs 
for manufacturing firms. In both cases the arguments for 
immediate deduction (expensing) are similar: to encourage 
R&D and IDC both because of spillover benefits to other 
firms,16 and because the useful life of research findings, or oil 
exploration, is hard to determine. Further, in the oil and gas 
industry, there is no "tangible" asset created by the drilling 
of the well—nothing with any "salvage value." Ignoring 
these arguments and clear parallels to other natural resource 
industries, the Menendez-Schumer bill would require the 
Big Five to capitalize all IDC, and deduct the costs over the 
life of the oil field, though independents could still expense 
100 percent of IDC and all other integrated firms could 
continue to expense 70 percent of such costs.
n  By eliminating percentage depletion for oil and gas produc-
tion by the Big Five and by eliminating the immediate 
deduction (expensing) of substances used in tertiary injec-
tion by the majors. Percentage depletion was effectively 
eliminated in 1975 for the majors, so formal elimination in 
the Menendez-Schumer bill amounts to symbolic discrimi-
nation. Eliminating the immediate deduction (expensing) 
of substances used in tertiary recovery, however, is another 
matter. Some methods inject carbon dioxide under high 
pressure into old fields, prolonging their useful life. These 
have the side benefit of curtailing the release of carbon 
dioxide  into  the  atmosphere.  Under  the  Menendez-
Schumer bill, expensing of the carbon dioxide (and other 
injectants) would no longer be permitted.17 
The Menendez bill focuses these tax law changes on the 
Big Five, and is calculated to raise about $21 billion over 10 
years. The Obama budget proposal does not single out the 
Big Five, but it would discriminate against all US oil and 
gas companies by comparison with other industries, raising 
about $36 billion over 10 years.18 According to estimates of 
the American Petroleum Institute—a trade association repre-
16. The most recent advances in shale gas exploration and development are 
clear examples of such spillover effects.
17. The Obama Administration’s 2012 budget would also lengthen the amor-
tization period for geological and geophysical studies (G&G). This provision 
was not embraced in the Menendez-Schumer bill since major integrated oil 
companies are already required to capitalize and amortize their G&G costs 
over seven years under IRC Section 167 (h).
18. Estimated from the Obama Administration’s 2012 budget. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 6   O C T O b e r  2 0 1 1
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senting the industry—these provisions applied to oil and gas 
companies could put nearly 60,000 jobs at risk in the year of 
implementation, and more later, as firms cut back exploration 
and production in the United States. Moreover, the provisions 
could discourage the majors from a deep dive into the high-
tech extraction of natural gas from shale, since the discrimina-
tory tax changes would equally apply to that activity. 
Not  only  do  these  provisions  discriminate  against  the 
majors  by  comparison  with  smaller  US  oil  and  gas  firms, 
they also discriminate against US-based firms by comparison 
with many foreign-based firms doing business in the United 
States  and  competing  in  the  same  geologic  basin.  Many 
foreign-based firms are not defined as “major integrated oil 
companies” and therefore would escape the penalties of the 
Menendez-Schumer bill. To take a leading example, within 
the Gulf of Mexico, about 90 oil and gas companies operate, 
and of these more than a quarter are foreign-based. Yet the 
Menendez-Schumer  provisions  would  discriminate  only 
against the five large majors, three of which are headquartered 
in the United States. 
Penalizing “Dual Capacity” Companies 
US-based “majors” and hard mineral companies face an addi-
tional attack—this time from the Obama Administration, but 
very similar to the attack directed against the Big Five in the 
Menendez bill. As a general practice, private oil companies pay 
royalties for the right to extract oil and gas and they also pay 
corporate income taxes on their earnings.19 The same descrip-
tion applies to many hard mineral companies, for example, 
copper and gold mining firms. Oil and hard minerals are often 
located  in  formations  owned  by  sovereign  governments—
either under the land (as in the Middle East and Russia) or 
offshore (as in the North Sea and off the coast of Africa). 
Consequently,  these  firms  are  known  as  “Dual  Capacity” 
taxpayers because they make payments to the foreign host 
government in two capacities: They pay both royalties for the 
right  to  extract  government-owned  resources  and  they  pay 
income taxes on their profits from extraction and sale.
The United States allows a foreign tax credit (FTC) to avoid 
double taxation when a US company does business abroad. 
Otherwise the firm would be taxed on the same income both 
by the foreign country and by the United States, under the US 
system of worldwide taxation. The FTC is designed to offset 
the US corporate tax liability by the amount of corporate taxes 
19. Current law is often mischaracterized by its proponents as "allowing" a tax 
credit for a payment that is not a tax, but instead a royalty. As the explanation 
in our text shows, the current IRS rules explicitly prohibit such a result, but 
that has not stopped the mischaracterization.
paid to the foreign country. Without the FTC, it would be 
impossible for US companies to do business abroad, since the 
combination of US and foreign corporate taxes would often 
claim 70 percent or more of corporate earnings.
In short, the FTC is a foundation stone of globalization. 
Without the FTC, few if any US firms could expand to become 
multinational corporations unless the United States joined the 
great majority of countries and adopted a system of territorial 
taxation rather than worldwide taxation. However, like any 
provision in the tax code, the FTC is subject to abuse. Forty 
years ago, the Treasury became concerned that some foreign 
countries  might  “go  easy”  on  royalty  payments,  but  “jack 
up” corporate tax payments, so that US-based MNCs could 
claim a foreign tax credit for payments which really amount 
to a business expense, namely a deduction for royalties. After 
extensive deliberation, the Treasury issued the “Dual Capacity” 
regulations designed to distinguish between foreign income 
taxes (credited against US income tax) and foreign royalties 
(deducted as a business expense). Under the regulations, the 
taxpayer has a choice between two methods for calculating its 
foreign tax credit. If the foreign corporate tax on oil or mineral 
income exceeds the general corporate tax rate in that country, 
the Dual Capacity taxpayer can claim the FTC for an amount 
that equals the general corporate income tax rate times the 
relevant income. This is the safe harbor method. Alternatively, 
if the Dual Capacity taxpayer can affirmatively demonstrate—
and prove in court when challenged by the IRS—that the 
individual facts and circumstances establish that the corporate 
income tax applied to oil or mineral income does not contain 
a disguised royalty, then the taxpayer can claim the actual tax 
paid as an FTC. This is the facts and circumstances method. If 
the Dual Capacity taxpayer elects the facts and circumstances 
route, but fails to establish its case, then the IRS would argue 
that none of the payment can be claimed as a foreign tax 
credit—instead the entire payment should be characterized as 
a royalty and deducted, along with other business expenses, in 
calculating corporate earnings subject to US taxation. 
The Dual Capacity regulations have served the Treasury and 
US-based MNCs well since they were implemented in 1983. 
But to squeeze more revenue, the Administration has proposed 
a new approach. Whenever the foreign corporate tax rate on oil 
or mineral income exceeds the general corporate tax rate in the 
country, the entire difference would be automatically character-
ized as a royalty—thereby depriving the firm of a portion of its 
foreign tax credit—whatever the facts and circumstances. Under 
current law, in order to claim the extra credit, the taxpayer bears 
the full burden of proof. Under the proposed rule, the taxpayer 
is denied the credit, regardless of the circumstances. To be sure, 
the proposed rule would raise additional tax revenue (estimated N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 6   O C T O b e r  2 0 1 1
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at $4.5 billion between 2012 and 2016), but at the cost of new 
discrimination against US oil and hard mineral firms.20 
The proposed rule assumes that any excess in the oil or hard 
mineral tax rate over the general tax rate amounts to a disguised 
royalty (Aldonas, Jenn, and Olson 2010). This is a false assump-
tion. There are good reasons why some countries, such as Norway 
and the United Kingdom, tax oil and hard mineral income at 
higher rates than other types of income. The firms are often 
big and profitable; just as the forces of US political economy 
impose discriminatory taxes on big and profitable corporations, 
so the forces of political economy abroad may demand a higher 
tax rate. Such discrimination is no more commendable abroad 
than in the United States, but it’s a fact of political life. Second, 
some countries, such as the Gulf States and Chile, may use tax 
policy as a tool to diversify their economy. Hence a low general 
corporate tax rate on service and manufacturing firms, may be 
coupled with a high rate on resource firms. In fact, the state of 
Alaska follows just this policy.
Apart  from  ignoring  the  true  reasons  for  high  taxation 
of resource income—reasons which have nothing to do with 
disguised royalties—the proposed rule is oblivious to the reali-
ties of international competition. State-owned oil giants—such 
as PetroChina, PetroBras, Saudi Aramco, and Gazprom—enjoy 
preferential access to resources in their home countries. For 
these firms, corporate taxation is simply not an issue, and it is 
not surprising that they have crowded out private resource firms 
over the past thirty years. But even leaving aside state-owned 
competitors, with few if any exceptions, private competitors of 
US firms are simply not taxed by their home countries on oil 
or mineral income earned abroad. Looking at the fifty largest 
oil  firms  in  the  world,  the  only  private  companies  subject 
to  worldwide  corporate  income  taxation  are  American.21 
Non-American private firms—such as BP (United Kingdom), 
Shell (Netherlands), Total (France), ENI (Italy), and Repsol 
YPF (Spain)—are based in countries that follow the principle 
of territorial taxation. Foreign income is generally not taxed by 
the home country; hence there are few if any foreign tax credits, 
and Dual Capacity issues do not arise. 
cOnclusIOn
The United States is a high-tax country for large corporations 
trying to do business. Statutory and average effective US corpo-
rate rates remain among the highest in OECD countries and far 
20. See the Obama Administration’s 2012 budget, page 185.
21. Chinese and Russian state-owned oil enterprises do pay taxes on their 
income earned abroad, but at rates significantly lower than the US corporate 
tax rate. Moreover they enjoy other advantages from their close relations to the 
state. 
exceed rates in China (table 1).22 But the fact of high rates will 
not prevent the United States from becoming a still higher tax 
country when fiscal deficits are finally addressed by the president 
and Congress. “Ability to pay” and similar populist arguments 
for raising corporate taxes will surely be rolled out in the context 
of  deliberations  in  the  new  Super  Committee  negotiations 
and subsequent ratification debate in Congress, scheduled for 
December 2011.23 The balance between spending cuts and tax 
hikes remains to be determined, but it seems unlikely that higher 
taxes will be completely off the table. And once taxes are on 
the table, it seems likely that some voices will urge higher taxes 
on large corporations. Higher taxes can take different forms. An 
outright increase in the statutory tax rate seems unlikely since 
there is talk on both sides of the political aisle of cutting the 
corporate rate from 35 percent to 25 percent. However there is 
also talk—especially in the US Treasury and the Democratic side 
of the aisle—of eliminating a wide range of corporate deductions 
without a dollar equivalent reduction in the corporate tax rate.24 
The  Congress  and  President  Obama  should  ignore  the 
voices calling for higher taxation of large corporations. These 
companies  already  pay  tax  rates  that  are  too  high,  both  by 
national and international standards, and the result is to drive 
business activity and jobs to other countries. Other solutions 
can  provide  better  results.  The  Administration  has  already 
shown that it can answer populist calls for higher taxes on rich 
Americans by espousing the Buffett Rule: No millionaire or 
billionaire should pay federal income taxes at a lower effective 
rate than middle class Americans.  25 But even if enacted, the 
Buffet Rule would make a very small dent in the America’s fiscal 
deficit. To make serious progress towards fiscal balance, while at 
the same time encouraging private business to expand produc-
tion, boost exports and create jobs, the United States should 
22. Effective tax rates are defined as taxes paid (at the margin, or in total) 
divided by corporate income consistently defined (again, at the margin or in 
total). 
23. The committee was created as part of the 2011 debt-limit negotiations 
which concluded with legislation specifying $900 billion in spending cuts over 
the next decade and the creation of a select Congressional committee which 
will recommend another $1.5 trillion of deficit reduction over the decade, 
subject to an up or down Congressional vote by December 2011.The follow-
ing Senators and Representatives were named by Congressional leaders to the 
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction: Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA), 
Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT), Sen. John Kerry (D-MA), Rep. Jim Clyburn (D-
SC), Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA), Sen. Jon 
Kyl (R-AZ), Sen. Pat Toomey (R-PA), Sen. Rob Portman (R-OH), Rep. Jeb 
Hensarling (R-TX), Rep. Dave Camp (R-MI), and Rep. Fred Upton (R-MI).
24. See, for example, the section starting on p. 49 in President Obama’s recent 
budget proposals, Living Within Our Means and Investing in the Future: The 
President’s Plan for Economic Growth and Deficit Reduction, available at 
www.whitehouse.gov. 
25. Warren Buffett, “Stop Coddling the Super-Rich,” The New York Times, 
August 14, 2011. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 6   O C T O b e r  2 0 1 1
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adopt a national consumption tax and, at the same time, slash 
corporate tax rates. The United States is one of the very few 
countries in the world which does not use this form of taxation, 
much to its disadvantage as a place to do business.26
Whatever is done, the Congress should eliminate and reject 
the sorts of discriminatory provisions and proposals highlighted 
in this Policy Brief. Since the Great Recession erupted in 2008, 
considerable alarm has been voiced over the rise of China. Some 
authors even foresee the “eclipse” of US economic power within 
a decade (Subramanian 2011). Whatever the merits of these 
forecasts, it makes no sense for the United States to erode its 
leadership position in the world economy by discriminating 
against the largest US-based corporations, thereby encouraging 
them to seek more favorable business climates abroad. 
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